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I. INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis came in the wake of significant reforms 
to the structures, processes, powers, and rules of the regulatory regimes 
for financial markets in many of the countries adversely affected by the 
crash. It is striking that the reformed regulatory regimes lacked the ca-
pacity both to anticipate and prevent the crisis that engulfed the world. 
Furthermore, even after this experience, it remains unclear whether regu-
lators account effectively for what they do. What we mean by “accounta-
bility” in this context depends on what we think accountability is for. If 
we think of accountability as an aspect of democratic governance, con-
cerned with reassuring us that regulators uphold their public mandates, 
then we might envisage a formal type of accountability. However, a 
claimed virtue of much regulation, including in the financial sector, is 
that it is informed as much or more by technical rather than democratic 
concerns. Giving priority to the technical character of much regulation 
might lead us to downplay the formal mechanisms of democratic ac-
countability, but we should do so only if we have in view mechanisms 
appropriate to the technical conception of regulatory roles. The issue is 
further complicated by the observation that much apparently technical 
regulation, whether carried out by public or private regulators, has capac-
ity to profoundly affect interests and is therefore necessarily political, 
even though it may have technical dimensions.
1
 
In this Article, I follow the logic of an argument that regulation 
necessarily has political dimensions, even where it may appear technical. 
I am asking questions about how we might best think about accountabil-
ity processes that encompass both democratic and technical dimensions 
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of regulation and how their respective concerns might be combined with-
in accountability regimes. Conceived of in this way, accountability needs 
to go beyond traditional public accountability forms, largely concerned 
with process, to include effective evaluation of performance in terms of 
better regulation, direct performance evaluation, and more sophisticated 
forms of regulatory audit. 
I consider the appropriateness and robustness of these mechanisms 
in light of significant trends that point towards continuing fragmentation 
of regulatory relationships generally and within financial markets in par-
ticular. Elements of this fragmentation include the gradual move in the 
centering of international financial markets from North America and Eu-
rope to Asia, a change accelerated by the global financial crisis and 
which is liable to reduce not only the market significance of New York 
and London, but also their concentration of public regulatory power. 
Second, there is the continuing pressure to move the emphasis of regula-
tion from the national level toward the supranational and even global 
level. While the ambition of such trends may be directed toward seeking 
to harmonize and create more uniform and robust regulation, imperfect 
globalization of regulation is likely to create opposite outcomes, leading 
to further fragmentation. Third, there is the increasing recognition of the 
centrality of transnational private regulation in setting norms and in mon-
itoring compliance in financial markets. Taken together, these fragment-
ing effects require a significant reevaluation of what effective accounta-
bility for regulators should mean. 
Conceiving of accountability as embracing both technical and polit-
ical requirements draws us towards a parallel world in which the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of regulation is a core part of oversight con-
cerns, alongside the issue of democratic concern with procedures. Poli-
cies of deregulation, regulatory reform, better regulation, and smart regu-
lation pursued in one form or another in most of the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Developement (OECD) member states are 
centrally concerned with promoting proportionate responses to problems 
defined as regulatory, with varying degrees of effectiveness. Distinct 
from better regulation are strategies of public sector audit concerned with 
promoting efficiency, economy, and effectiveness in the expenditure of 
public monies, including on regulation. A further distinct set of concerns 
within regulatory policy are measures targeted at developing perfor-
mance indicators and the evaluation of performance. 
When we look at these concerns with process and effectiveness to-
gether, it is helpful to conceive of the overall oversight, or regulation, of 
regulation as a legitimate and distinct set of concerns and operational 
activities of government, addressed not only to public regulation but to 
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increasingly important regimes of private regulation. Thus, there is a dis-
cipline of regulating regulation, not fully recognized, and comprising a 
variety of different fields of activity and disciplines that should increas-
ingly be concerned with promoting accountability based on both process 
and performance. 
II. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The global financial crisis struck major financial markets in 2008, 
following a period of quite extensive reform of structures and process of 
financial regulators across many of the leading national regimes.
2
 There 
was a good deal of confidence amongst regulators that, armed with new 
powers, new knowledge, and new techniques, they were more than equal 
to the tasks of protecting the public interest in financial markets. This 
confidence was based not simply on what they knew about regulation, 
but also on what they thought they knew about efficient markets.
3
 As 
Julia Black argues, it was not so much that the new tools of regulation 
were faulty but rather that they were applied poorly,
4
 whether for reasons 
of lack of understanding, as some of the official reports discussed below 
suggest, or because of a combination of ideologies and interests that fa-
vored the key actors in financial markets.
5
 
Many hypotheses have been advanced to explain the global finan-
cial crisis. A common thread running through many analyses is attribu-
tion of responsibility to weaknesses in the management of risk by market 
actors and poor understanding and implementation of oversight regimes 
by regulators. Clearly market actors did things, and were permitted to do 
so, that were against the interests both of their own organizations and of 
the states in which they were located. There was limited knowledge 
amongst banks and regulators of the systemic risks being created through 
extensive interdependence of transactions. 
In subsequent inquiries, each jurisdiction has sought to identify the 
causes of the problems each faced from the financial crisis. In Ireland, a 
report from the Central Bank of Ireland concluded that major responsibil-
ity lay with bank directors but also with weaknesses in regulation. The 
report found that the Financial Regulator emphasized processes over out-
comes and failed to develop independent evaluations of risks presented 
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by banks. Patrick Honohan, who led in authoring the report, noted that 
the undue deference shown to the banking sector constituted a form of 
regulatory capture: 
Thus, it would have been known within the [Financial Regulator] 
that intrusive demands from line staff could be and were set aside 
after direct representations were made to senior regulators.
6
 
The British Turner Report identified weaknesses in the capacity of 
financial markets that had not been understood by banks or regulators. 
National regulators were depending on regulators operating in the home 
jurisdictions of banks doing business transnationally, but home regula-
tors were typically looking only at the national and not the global foot-
print. Key examples included the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the 
Icelandic Landsbanksi.
7
 The official European Union (EU) investigation, 
chaired by Jacques de Larosière, identified failures in risk assessment by 
banks and regulators but also in poor sharing of information by regula-
tors and over-dependence on ratings agencies.
8
 
The United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded 
that the crisis was avoidable: 
The captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial sys-
tem ignored warnings and failed to question, understand, and man-
age evolving risks within a system essential to the well-being of the 
American public.
9
 
These now well documented regulatory failings occurred in part because 
of technical and cognitive weaknesses, but also because of the political 
factors of deference to banks and an ideology that believed in efficient 
markets.
10
 
Independent regulation is, of course, supposed to be a solution to 
the problem of politicians favoring powerful industrial interests.
11
 It is 
striking that this cataclysmic regulatory failure occurred at a time when 
                                                          
 6. PATRICK HONOHAN ET AL., CENT. BANK OF IR., THE IRISH BANKING CRISIS: REGULATORY 
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY POLICY 2003–2008, ¶ 1.13, at 9 (2009), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/24896/1/MPRA_paper_24896.pdf. 
 7. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xvii (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.. 
 8. DE LAROSIÈRE GRP., HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU 8–11 
(2009) (Belg.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_ 
en.pdf. 
 9. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7. 
 10. Froud et al., supra note 3. 
 11 . Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-
Majoritarian Institutions, 25 W. EUR. POL. 1 (2002). 
2014]Evaluating the Performance and Accountability of Regulators 357 
the “rise of the regulatory state” had occurred, offering solutions to at 
least two sets of governance problems. The first of these problems is the 
risk that where the state regulates directly through government depart-
ments headed by elected politicians, decisions may be driven by consid-
eration of short-term political gain. Such political short termism yields, at 
best, regulation that is incapable of supporting the mature development 
of regulated markets over time and, at worse, regulation the purpose of 
which is to support the interests of those who are friendly with elected 
politicians rather than the public.
12
 The rise of the regulatory state has 
been about insulating regulatory decision making from both self-
interested structures of self-regulation and self-interested structures of 
politics—across the financial industry, network industries, food and 
pharmaceuticals sectors, amongst others.
13
 
The second problem is the limited technical capacity of elected 
government officials to undertake regulation in areas as complex as fi-
nancial markets. The establishment of independent agencies, with a focus 
on particular tasks, is one of the key mechanisms for drawing in and de-
veloping expertise in particular regulatory policy areas. The establish-
ment of regulation with its governance through rules, with arms-length 
regulators, is intended to support agencies in establishing a high degree 
of technical expertise—for example, through recruitment practices, 
which are somewhat distinct and perhaps on better terms than standard 
public sector recruitment activities, and with a clear orientation from the 
top towards purposive regulation rather than the wider array of political 
concerns that typically characterize departments and ministers.
14
 
We tolerate the detachment of regulation from the normal mecha-
nisms of control and accountability associated with the public service 
only because of an expectation that regulation will be apolitical and ex-
pert.
15
 If neither claim for regulation can be delivered on, then this is a 
significant problem. The global financial crisis demonstrates a failure of 
regulation to achieve the very outcomes for which it is supposed to be 
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strong. Failures of regulation more generally have presented a significant 
challenge to trust in regulation to deliver on public interest objectives.
16
 
So there is a significant challenge to trust in regulation. The finan-
cial crisis has resulted in calls for an end to self-regulation and in chal-
lenges to the legitimacy of national regulation, markets, and proposed 
solutions, which involve a larger role for EU agencies and even global 
regulators.
17
 Other concerns apply across regulation more generally, 
which include anxieties about ineffectiveness, distance from government, 
and the relatively short relational distance between regulators and regu-
lated firms.
18
 In short, regulation is now a problem that requires address-
ing, as much as it is a solution. 
What we might call the political focus of regulation is frequently on 
the rule making, which in many jurisdictions continues to be undertaken 
by legislative bodies even where implementation tasks have been as-
signed to specialist agencies. Although rule making does give rise to 
problems, partly because of risks of favoring particular interests and part-
ly because of questions about the capacity to legislate effectively for 
technical areas of economic life, arguably key challenges to the legitima-
cy of regulation lie more with the manner in which regimes are imple-
mented in terms of monitoring and enforcement.
19
 
III. FRAGMENTED REGULATION 
There is a tendency to think of regulation by reference to the strong 
tradition of independent federal regulatory agencies in the United States. 
Within the rather similar tradition of Canadian regulatory institutions, the 
powerful independent regulators have been characterized as “govern-
ments in miniature” because of their tendency to take on powers to make 
rules, to monitor for compliance, and to apply enforcement sanctions 
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without the intervention of courts.
20
 The U.S. experience of powerful 
independent regulators is somewhat atypical, by international stand-
ards.
21
 Elsewhere it has been more common to find regulatory powers 
divided between different public bodies with, for example, rule-making 
powers reserved to legislatures or ministers exercising delegated powers 
to make regulations or issue decrees, and the powers to apply formal 
sanctions reserved to courts or specialist tribunals. Within such regimes, 
regulatory agencies tend to exercise restricted powers focused on moni-
toring and initiating enforcement actions, with advisory roles in respect 
of rule making. 
If it is correct to suggest that regulatory power, even in the context 
of domestic public regulation, is somewhat fragmented, the tendency 
towards fragmentation is amplified considerably by the roles of suprana-
tional and international governmental bodies such as the EU institutions, 
the World Trade, and various U.N. organizations like the International 
Labor Organization and the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
22
 Further 
fragmentation is attributable to the growing significance of private or-
ganizations such as standard setting bodies—for example, the Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the European Committee for Stand-
ardization (CEN), and other private regulators that have proliferated 
across a wide range of fields in recent years, including financial markets, 
environmental protection, fair trade, accounting standards, advertising, 
and so on.
23
 
Accounts of the global financial crisis identified fragmentation both 
of markets and of regulation as a key cause of the problems, notably be-
cause financial markets actors operating across many jurisdictions 
seemed to be subject to inadequate controls in circumstances where the 
regulator in one’s home jurisdiction lacked power and capacity to moni-
tor across all jurisdictions.
24
 Equally, the vagaries of private regulation, 
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notably by credit ratings agencies and through the standardization and 
extension of credit default swaps effectively setting the terms for com-
plex financial instruments, were also identified as key sources for failure 
to know about and to understand sufficiently the risks associated with 
complex financial products traded across jurisdictions.
25
 It is unsurpris-
ing that one of the responses to the financial crisis was to seek to harmo-
nize regulation at a global level to a greater extent. It is equally unre-
markable that the pressures, which have caused the emergence of frag-
mented regulation, have equally inhibited moves toward harmonization. 
The challenges associated with accountability for regulation are as com-
plex as the regimes to which accountability relates. 
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY 
Thinking about regulators generally, where they are national public 
agencies, they are typically designed in such a fashion that they have a 
degree of independence from elected politicians, accompanied by mech-
anisms of oversight or accountability.
26
 The value attributed to independ-
ence derives from arguments that regulators should be oriented towards 
expert decision making, insulated from day-to-day political concerns, 
and that if decision making is more political in character, then it should 
be retained by elected politicians rather than delegated.
27
 The fact of del-
egation makes accountability important, but also problematic.
28
 
Addressing a crisis of trust in regulation is not straightforward. We 
might be concerned to target the fidelity of regulators to their mandate, 
which would suggest addressing procedural weaknesses in their activi-
ties, or alternatively we might be more interested in the outcomes of their 
activities, which would suggest a different form of evaluation altogether. 
We can think of both sets of concerns as being rooted in accountability 
for regulation. 
I have elsewhere argued that we can conceive of accountability up-
wards (notably to courts, legislature, and ministers), horizontally (nota-
bly to other agencies such as ombudsman, supreme audit institutions, and 
information regulators), and downwards (notably to regulatees and to 
intended beneficiaries of a regime).
29
 These three modes of accountabil-
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ity map on to three forms of governance based, respectively, on hierar-
chy, community, and market.
30
 
Mark Bovens has suggested that accountability is best conceived of 
as a relationship in which the organization being held to account has an 
obligation to explain its activities to another organization that may pose 
questions, make judgments, and (possibly) deliver consequences for fail-
ings.
31
 But what is the content of these varied forms of relationship? 
Notwithstanding their different characteristics, I suggest that the domi-
nant strand of even a broadly based conception of accountability is com-
pliance with rules. Thus, we might ask, did a regulator follow the pre-
scribed procedures? Did he or she spend the money and hire staff in ac-
cordance with public sector norms? Did he or she exceed his powers or 
neglect to do something he was mandated to do? This is about public 
mandates and providing reassurance that they are complied with. In this 
context, accountability is fundamentally about democratic governance, 
tolerant of delegation of powers, but ensuring that those to whom power 
is delegated do only that which is authorized in the form that is required. 
Holding regulators to account for the substance of their actions in 
making rules, or in monitoring and enforcing them, is less common and 
more challenging. It requires us to ask more difficult questions about 
how effective the regulator is and how they can demonstrate the quality 
and effectiveness of what they do. The challenge for accountability is 
simultaneously to address technical weaknesses (substantive outcomes) 
and the fragile democratic legitimacy of regulation. These twin concerns 
are significant problems for public regulation. Both problems—technical 
credibility and democratic legitimacy—are even more significant for pri-
vate regulators. 
Private regulation, as opposed to government-based independent 
regulation, remains central for financial regulation. Key examples of pri-
vate regulators include the monitoring activities of credit rating agencies, 
used to assess the financial position of both banks and sovereign gov-
ernments, and the International Accounting Standards Board that deter-
mines the International Financial Reporting Standards, which provide the 
central reporting and auditing requirements for financial performance of 
both private and public actors in most jurisdictions. Other important re-
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gimes include those for setting and interpreting the terms of derivatives 
transactions, largely determined by the private activities of the Interna-
tional Swaps and Dealers Association (ISDA), not to mention self-
regulatory oversight of the conduction of accounting and legal profes-
sionals who are so central to implementing both market and regulatory 
actions.
32 
Any accountability solution must address public and private 
regulation.
33
 
V. BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY TO PERFORMANCE 
I now come at this problem from a different perspective. If it is cor-
rect to argue, as I do, that democratic modes of accountability are at best 
incomplete, what are the best available alternatives or complements, and 
what is their capacity to capture aspects of performance? To what extent 
has the art of accountability taken in a concern to evaluate or require 
regulators to evaluate their performance? A fully external performance 
evaluation is, of course, different from oversight of self-evaluation. The 
core question, and one of intense interest to market and governmental 
actors, is how do we know whether regulators are doing a good job or 
not? 
This starting point is not immediately looking for solutions to the 
problem of trust in regulation but rather observing an important trend in 
regulatory oversight towards performance evaluation and accountability. 
Turning to the performance evaluation of regulators, I note that although 
a number of national bodies (for example, the Australian Productivity 
Commission) and supranational organizations (notably the OECD) have 
begun to pursue the question of how to evaluate regulatory performance, 
the topic has had, at best, a marginal role in contemporary regulatory 
science. There is, for example, no discussion of performance indicators 
and performance evaluation in two leading handbooks of regulation pub-
lished in 2010 and 2012.
34
 
Performance evaluation provides a mechanism to address claims to 
technical expertise of regulators and thus the potential to evaluate regula-
tors on their own terms. The OECD’s work on the assessment of regula-
tory performance has found that there are few functioning examples of 
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regimes available and that the task of evaluating regulatory performance 
is extremely challenging.
35
 
Demands for performance evaluation are increasingly prominent 
from market actors, governments, and civil society organizations. Regu-
latory agencies are frequently established to create a form of discipline 
on governments themselves, preventing them from acting on short-term 
political concerns, and to demonstrate credibility in the capacity for long-
term policy stability and effectiveness. For national governments, there is 
a concern for principals to know better whether regulators to whom they 
delegate power are up to the tasks they have been set, whether in finan-
cial markets or in other sectors such as food, communications, pharma-
ceuticals, and prisons. For supranational bodies, not only the OECD but 
also the EU and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), there are 
concerns to ensure that regulation operating across jurisdictions is effec-
tive at securing its permitted outcomes and that it is not pursuing non-
legitimate (e.g., protective) purposes. With private regulation, the very 
purpose of the regime is to achieve some effect, such as enhancing the 
sustainability of forestry or ensuring fair prices are paid to growers of 
commodities such as chocolate and coffee. Buyers of the products, both 
retailers and consumers, need to be confident that the promised condi-
tions for production or purchase have been met or else there is no point 
in paying extra to have the protections of the regime.
36
 For some areas of 
private regulation such as technical standards, market take-up and market 
discipline may be sufficient. Effectiveness as judged by market actors is 
key to legitimacy. For any regime, evidence of ineffectiveness (e.g., in 
monitoring and enforcement) may damage credibility of an entire re-
gime, leading to withdrawal of support from market or governmental 
actors. 
What mechanisms exist that offer at least some basis of accounting 
for regulatory performance? Since the early 1980s, governments amongst 
the OECD member states have been seeking to apply a braking mecha-
nism of sorts to their own urges to regulate policy problems.
37
 There 
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would be a desire to ratchet regulatory requirements on businesses and 
others without evaluation of costs and benefits, without mechanisms 
originally referred to as deregulation but now more commonly thought of 
as processes of better regulation. Better regulation policies provide an 
example of regulation over government itself where some cross-
departmental unit is typically concerned with setting and overseeing re-
quirements on departments and others are responsible for setting regula-
tory rules to ensure that they properly evaluate them at the outset via re-
view of both existing and new rules. The OECD has been a key propo-
nent of such initiatives, providing its member states with the challenge of 
building institutional capacity and political commitment for oversight of 
regulation.
38
 Such regimes are now widely found in OECD member 
states, with aspirations to regulate performance of policy makers and 
rule-setters but with rather patchy effects on the ground. 
Regimes of better regulation focus primarily on decisions around 
regulatory responses to policy problems with an evaluation process re-
ferred to generically (though it differs across jurisdictions) as a regulato-
ry impact analysis (RIA).
39
 In the process of completeing an RIA, offi-
cials concerned with introducing regulation consider alternatives and 
then evaluate potential costs, benefits, and impacts of rules or other ac-
tions.
40
 
While RIA processes command wide support as a mechanism for 
requiring evaluation during the policy process for new regulation, they 
are also subject to widespread criticism. First, though most regimes re-
quire an evaluation of alternatives to regulation, such as doing nothing or 
promoting self-regulation, many policy makers appear to commence RI-
As only when there is already an administrative or political commitment 
to making rules (thus ruling out the less costly alternatives).
41
 Second, 
RIAs are open to similar objections to cost benefit analyses where costs 
are often easier to pin down than benefits.
42
 In the case of RIAs, this is 
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particularly significant as business consultees are often in a better positon 
to argue about costs than is true for beneficiaries and benefits. Therefore, 
there is an undue bias against regulation. A third concern is the scope of 
better regulation regimes. While the Australian Office of Best Practice 
Regulation seeks to apply better regulation principles to self- and private-
regulation as well as public regulation, most regimes focus narrowly on 
government-made rules. This thereby excludes from consideration those 
regimes that may be important with the potential for both costs and bene-
fits but in which rules are not made by state bodies.
43
 It is significant for 
my argument to note that better regulation regimes have been rather 
poorly applied to processes of implementation. Obvious issues concern-
ing the costs and benefits of enforcing regulation in different ways are 
rarely subject to the scrutiny of better regulation, though separate pro-
cesses for reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement 
have been undertaken in some countries, for example the United King-
dom and Australia.
44
 
The ambition to set and evaluate regulators’ performance against 
indicators moves us considerably beyond the territory of better regulation 
and into processes of implementation and effects of regimes on the 
ground. Performance evaluation is a key part of many government public 
management systems. For example, in the United Kingdom, reforms dur-
ing the early 1990s led to the separation of policy and operational tasks 
within government departments. The latter were assigned to “next steps” 
or executive agencies and were accompanied by ambitions to adopt a 
new rigor in setting performance indicators as part of the mechanisms of 
control over public sector performance. An early review of the setting 
and oversight of performance indicators for the Department of Social 
Security agencies revealed an emphasis on process and quantitative effi-
ciency in setting the indicators and a reluctance to tackle the more de-
manding quantitative effectiveness indicators.
45
 Since then, the ambition 
to oversee and evaluate performance of public sector bodies generally 
and regulatory agencies in particular has remained high on the public 
management agenda.
46
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Some better regulation units have examined aspects of how to un-
derstand regulatory performance in a more sophisticated manner. Fol-
lowing an inquiry into Victoria’s Regulatory Framework in 2011, the 
Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission concluded there were 
a number of enhancements that could be made to the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of regulation in the state. Their recommendations included 
the setting of clear regulatory objectives and the adoption of procedures 
for all regulators in terms of monitoring and reporting on outcomes.
47
 At 
the federal level, the Australian government has sought to benchmark 
regulatory performance as part of the policy on reducing regulatory bur-
dens. More specifically, the Australian government wants this from state 
and territory regulation through national coordination. The studies pub-
lished by the Productivity Commission as part of this process are sub-
stantially targeted at assessing efficiency of regulation rather than its out-
comes and effectiveness. The Productivity Commission distinguished 
regulatory design from administration and enforcement in its initial re-
port. Its proposed indicators on regulatory administration were chiefly 
focused on processes such as frequency of reporting, a provision for 
online contact, and appeals.
48
 Similarly, the main focus with enforcement 
was on such procedural matters and whether there was a provision for 
enforcement and whether the relevant agencies published enforcement 
strategies.
49
 
The OECD has developed a program to consider more fully how to 
evaluate regulatory performance by examining outcomes and effects, as 
well matters of process and efficiency, by recognizing clear interest 
amongst its member states for a better understanding of when regulators 
are doing a good job. The OECD’s own guidelines on regulatory policy 
recommend that member states measure the effects of regulatory policy 
against intended outcomes.
50
 In the OECD’s 2009 report, Indicators of 
Regulatory Management Systems, the primary focus was on regulatory 
design. One chapter addresses measures to improve the quality of exist-
ing regulations, and only two pages examined ex post regulatory review 
and evaluation, with no direct focus on evaluating the performance of 
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regulators.
51
 This provides some evidence of the difficulty in moving 
beyond the traditional concerns for improving regulation policy, focusing 
on rule making and regulatory design. The main impetus for offering a 
more challenging view of the potential for evaluating regulatory perfor-
mance is found in three research papers by academics commissioned by 
the OECD.
52
 
Cary Coglianese sets down an ambitious agenda for regulatory pol-
icy evaluation in his OECD paper, which requires robust indicators and a 
research design capable of supporting inferences on the extent to which 
regulatory action caused changes in the identified performance indica-
tors. Coglianese divides the types of relevant performance indicators into 
those relating to impact on the targeted problem, cost effectiveness (how 
much is spent for any level of impact), and the net benefits (a calculation 
of the positive outcomes less the costs attributable to negative impacts), 
indicating a preference for this last kind of indicator as best encompass-
ing both the intent and the costs of regulation.
53
 Two things stand out 
from Coglianese’s propositions. First, measuring regulatory impact is 
extremely challenging. Second, efforts to assess performance by refer-
ence to process indicators such as timeliness of processing, availability 
of appeals, etc., may be important for assessing legitimacy of regulatory 
actors, but it contributes little to performance evaluation in the sense that 
it is described by Coglianese. 
The selection of performance indicators raises a number of chal-
lenges. As “calculative practices” are increasingly recognized as tools of 
government, it is acknowledged that the very act of measuring may affect 
behavior, diverting attention of actors to the targeted numbers and away 
from other important aspects of their activities.
54
 More generally, the set-
ting of targets creates risks that key actors will game the figures, priori-
tizing the demonstration of a satisfactory outcome over the delivery of 
the outcome.
55
 The use of indicators to then evaluate the nature of out-
comes and effects deriving from regulation raises a range of methodolog-
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ical challenges. Coglianese highlights the difficulties of separating de-
sired outcomes from other outcomes by reference to the indicators and, 
more critically, working out what caused the relevant observed changes 
in behavior and relevant outcomes.
56
 He describes the evaluation of regu-
latory performance in this way as a key aspect of evidence-based policy, 
showing a preference for quantitative methods, where possible using 
randomized trials, to offer the best possibility of distinguishing the ef-
fects of regulation from other causes for observed outcomes. 
While better regulation policies have substantially neglected the 
evaluation of regulatory performance, the development of public sector 
audit has gradually evolved from its concerns with financial probity to 
address performance of public sector organizations.
57
 The principal con-
cern of performance auditing in the public sector has been financial (the 
three Es of value for money—efficiency, effectiveness, and economy). 
There has been some movement beyond financial performance to wider 
performance evaluation in some jurisdictions.
58
 For Mike Power, the 
“audit explosion” has been one of the key characteristics of public sector 
management reforms.
59
 The application of performance auditing methods 
to regulatory regimes has been most developed in the United Kingdom. 
“Regulatory audit” was initially tied to better regulation and rule making 
in the United Kingdom. The National Audit Office (NAO) was asked to 
conduct performance audits in respect of a number of regimes.
60
 
Regulatory audit in the United Kingdom has become more general-
ly concerned with enhancing the effectiveness of the regulatory state, 
using the substantially soft power of the public sector audit function. 
Regulatory audit processes have moved beyond assessment of RIA to 
addressing existing regulations and relations between regulators and reg-
ulated firms. The U.K. NAO has been centrally involved with imple-
menting the major review of regulatory burdens initiated in Philip Hamp-
ton’s Treasury report.61 This has involved a cross sectoral program to 
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reduce regulatory burdens and includes oversight by the NAO of pro-
cesses engagement, risk analysis, and evaluation.
62
 
One further form of scrutiny over regulatory performance has 
emerged through the development of forms of network governance at 
both the national and international levels. Network governance is a non-
hierarchical mode for organizing and steering behavior through such 
mechanisms as mutual surveillance, reporting, benchmarking, and peer 
review.
63
 Key examples include the OECD itself, which regularly reports 
on the performance of its member states in matters such as regulatory 
reform and regulatory performance, the development of European net-
works of regulators in areas such as energy, communications, and com-
petition, and thirdly, the development of national networks of regulators 
which, at least informally, compare performance of regulatory regimes 
across sectors.
64
 The OECD has clear concerns to use its offices and soft 
networking authority to learn about, enhance, and disseminate tools for 
regulating more effectively.
65
 
This discussion of the development of mechanisms for evaluating 
regulatory performance should not be limited to the initiatives of gov-
ernmental and inter-governmental organizations. Private actors have 
played a key role in developing evaluative mechanisms. Private tools for 
ranking the performance of regulators in league tables provide key ex-
amples. Between 2004 and 2010, the European Competitive Telecom-
munications Association (ECTA) produced a “Regulatory Scorecard,” 
which compared European regulators on a number of key aspects of reg-
ulatory performance.
66
 This scorecard combined evaluations of proce-
dural matters with regulatory outcomes in terms of market liberalization 
across key market segments. This tool was developed to put pressure 
both on EU authorities and national governments to sustain and develop 
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policies as well as implement instruments to support access for new en-
trants to communications markets. The private journal, Global Competi-
tion Review (GCR), produced a similar private league table to evaluate 
international performance of competition regulators.
67
 
The ECTA and GCR rankings of regulators are developed external 
to the evaluated regimes. An equally significant development concerns 
the attempt to develop mechanisms for evaluating regulatory perfor-
mance within private regulatory regimes. There are a number of market-
led private regulatory regimes for which credibility with market actors is 
vital to their continuing success.
68
 The raison-d’etre for Fair Trade and 
Forest Stewardship regimes, for example, is that their activities make a 
difference in enhancing the income to small producers and enhancing the 
sustainability of forestry.
69
 If their outcomes against these objectives 
were negligible, confidence that their processes were good would not 
defend them from complete collapse since they are dependent on con-
sumers and retailers choosing to buy products to which their labels have 
been attached.
70
 The umbrella organization for these private labeling re-
gimes, originally The International Social and Environmental Accredita-
tion and Labeling Alliance, now just ISEAL Alliance, was established in 
1999 to coordinate representations to governments and to develop com-
mon sustainability standards for a group of private regulators. Today, this 
includes a wide range of label-based regulatory regimes.
71
 ISEAL has 
turned its attention to the development of macro-standards for its mem-
bers, which are concerned with differentiating its members from others 
and promoting their credibility.
72
 Of central interest is the work ISEAL 
has undertaken on credibility standards with respect to the influence of 
regulation. The ISEAL Impacts Code, adopted in 2011, requires the es-
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tablishment of monitoring and evaluation programs; the definition of the 
intended change; establishment of appropriate indicators; data collection 
and evaluation; evaluation reports; and learning and improvement. Thus, 
it is reflexive in character, drawing on the learning capacity not only of 
the particular private regulatory regimes but also on the experiences of 
other ISEAL members.
73
 Together, the combination of detailed require-
ments around performance and both external evaluation and oversight by 
ISEAL makes the Impacts Code considerably more advanced than any 
equivalent regime of substantive performance evaluation for public regu-
lators. What is particularly intriguing is that the push for this private re-
gime of performance evaluation provides evidence for the suggestion 
that effective meta-regulation may be driven by a combination of market 
and community pressures, rather than from government and hierarchy.
74
 
VI. REGULATION AND POST-REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Contemporary regulatory practices continue to raise acute problems 
of both democratic legitimacy and performance. These practices combine 
public and private action and operate at national, transnational, and inter-
national levels. In the wake of the financial crisis, the question of how 
can we know whether regulators are being effective remains one of cen-
tral importance. The concerns with democracy and performance are 
sometimes presented as being mutually exclusive, and the history of del-
egation to independent regulators reflects a concern to loosen democratic 
control in order to promote technical capacity, insulated to a degree from 
political concerns. 
Evidence of performance is increasingly important but raises signif-
icant challenges. How can we achieve greater transparency in perfor-
mance and tie that transparency to capacity to use the knowledge for a 
substantive form of accountability but perhaps also participation? As I 
come to theorize the multiple mechanisms for overseeing regulatory per-
formance in this Part of the Article, I argue that democratic and technical 
concerns about regulation can be located within democratic theory in 
such a way that they are mutually reinforcing rather than inconsistent. A 
starting point is to note that the plausibility of representative democracy 
models is already called into question since many citizens feel alienated 
from regimes where executive power is more central than the power of 
directly elected legislative institutions, and national governmental auton-
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omy is comprised by both inter-governmental and private decision mak-
ing and action on key issues. Traditional accountability narratives em-
phasize parliamentary accountability, judicial review, and financial pro-
bity and still struggle to address the challenges of public, private, and 
supranational regulation.
75
 This concern does not require us to abandon 
ideals around representative democracy, but it suggests that the model is 
incomplete. This is because of the distance between key nodes of power 
such as regulatory agencies, intergovernmental organizations, major 
firms, as well as elected institutions. Put another way, this approach does 
not discard traditional concerns of accountability and democracy; rather, 
it focuses on inputs and throughputs. It also supplements them with a 
focus on outputs and outcomes. Observations of this kind lie behind the 
work of John Keane in seeking to elaborate a theory that better embraces 
the diffusing governance practice to which we are subject.
76
 
Keane notes that there has been a significant level of institutional 
response to a challenge he characterizes as one of “post-representative 
democracy.” As Keane himself notes, the innovations date back a con-
siderable period. He observes the very wide range of structures that have 
emerged for soliciting and making transparent information about govern-
ance activities (both public and private) and processes for inclusion and 
participation. Examples include advisory bodies; town hall meetings; 
think tanks; advocacy services; networks; democratic audits; official in-
quiries; integrity commissions; reports and score cards; blogging, Twit-
ter, and other social media; judicial activism; workplace tribunals; public 
interest litigation; and international forums and summits.
77
 I would also 
add the development of value for money audit, public and private sector 
ombudsman schemes, and international bodies that have become increas-
ingly inclusive of civil society and business organizations such as the 
International Labor Organization.
78 
I include regulatory agencies as key 
mechanisms in this list as well. Regulatory agencies create sources of 
knowledge and authority that are partially independent of elected gov-
ernment and have the capacity to challenge and hold elected govern-
ments to account in key areas of decision making, sometimes through 
serial powers (in which either can veto) or sometimes through parallel 
powers (in which either can act without the other).
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Taken together, these developments underpin what Keane refers to 
as “monitory democracy” comprising a wide variety of new “power 
monitoring inventions.”80 
Monitoring institutions play various roles. They are committed to 
providing publics with extra viewpoints and better information 
about the operations and performance of various governmental and 
non-governmental bodies. . . . Monitory mechanisms are geared as 
well to the definition, scrutiny[,] and enforcement of public stand-
ards and ethical rules for preventing corruption, or the improper be-
haviour [sic] of those responsible for making decisions, not only in 
the field of elected government, but in a wide variety of non-
governmental settings. The new institutions of monitory democracy 
are further defined by their overall commitment to strengthening the 
diversity and influence of their citizens’ voices and choices in deci-
sions that affect their lives—regardless of the outcomes of elec-
tions.
81
 
Keane ties these mechanisms of oversight and participation into demo-
cratic theory, arguing that the significance of democracy is to prevent 
rule by the few to ensure that “the matter of who gets what, when[,] and 
how should be permanently an open question.”82 This reminds us that 
nearly all regulatory decisions have political consequences. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have raised significant technical and theoretical 
challenges for the development of performance accountability over regu-
lation. The technical challenges include finding ways to set performance 
indicators for regulatory bodies and to better understand how the actions 
of regulators affect outcomes, not just for financial regulation but more 
generally, and not just for public regulators but also for private bodies. 
There is some evidence that private regulators driven by market concerns 
are in a better position to resolve some of these issues. 
Broader questions are pertinent to those who may have the interest 
and capacity to use information about regulator performance to monitor 
and hold to account. Again the track record of governments has not been 
strong, but governmental activity when accompanied by the activities of 
others, including inter-governmental bodies, regulatees, investors, and 
non-governmental organizations, constitutes a stronger overall regime for 
monitoring regulatory activity. 
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The dispersed model of monitory democracy, discussed in the last 
Part of this Article, has the virtue of matching the fragmented models 
found in contemporary regulatory governance. It offers the potential for 
oversight, which is at least as diverse as the regulatory practices being 
scrutinized, with the potential to conceive of oversight matching the ac-
tivities being overseen in range and scope. But if we can make a virtue of 
this diffused monitoring democracy, then this raises the question of how 
much is enough? How many of these forms of scrutiny are required to be 
able to credibly defend a regime overall as giving rise to appropriate ac-
countability for performance, and at what point do the costs of diffused 
accountability become too great to be justified? A different but equally 
significant challenge is asking how regimes of scrutiny can be developed 
so as to incorporate feedback-learning into the activities being overseen 
so that they go beyond accountability to promote development along ap-
propriate lines shaped by the participation of the scrutiny actors. 
I do not underestimate the technical and theoretical challenges of 
casting accountability for regulatory performance as comprising the ag-
gregate activities of diverse actors deploying diverse methods. A starting 
point is to seek to understand particular regimes in these terms with the 
potential for interventions by public or private actors to address weak-
nesses that are addressed, both in terms of targeting and understanding 
performance and the effects of regulation on outcomes and the broader 
range of constitutional questions about participation and learning.
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